Earlier today I finished Eric Schlosser’s excellent book, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety. Using a deadly 1980 incident at a Titan-II missile silo in Arkansas as the entry point, Schlosser examines the history of nuclear weapons from the Manhattan Project to post-9/11.
Highly readable, the narrative frightens, astonishes and angers in turns. Mishaps and near mishaps are detailed, as are bureaucratic infighting among the military branches, doctrinal disagreements between politicians and generals, and the personal bravery of many who worked to keep the bombs safe from the drawing board to those in and around them in the field.
Schlosser’s vivid recreation of the silo incident at Damascus, Arkansas, is spread throughout the book, an editorial concept that I found brilliant. The focus shifts from that claustrophobic, spiraling-out-of-control situation to overviews of how the United States developed its nuclear warplans and stockpiles, peppered with plenty of stories of mismanagement and mistakes that somehow didn’t end up with a nuclear detonation. Some reviewers found the back-and-forth disorienting, but I thought it worked exceptionally well to tell both stories, the tactical and the strategic, as it were.